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Τι (ποιος) είναι dilemma$21363$ - ορισμός

CONFLICT OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS THAT ARISES BETWEEN SHORT-TERM DOMESTIC AND LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES FOR COUNTRIES WHOSE CURRENCIES SERVE AS GLOBAL RESERVE CURRENCIES
Trifflin's Dilemma; Trifflin's dilemma; Triffin's Dilemma; Triffin Dilemma; Triffin's dilemma; Triffin paradox; Młynarski dilemma

Euthyphro dilemma         
ETHICAL PROBLEM ON THE ORIGIN OF MORALITY POSED BY SOCRATES
Euthyphro Dilemma; Euthyphro problem; Euthyphro's dilemma; Euthrypo dilemma; Euthyphros dilemma; Euthaphros dilemma; Euthaphro's dilemma; God-centered morality
The Euthyphro dilemma is found in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks Euthyphro, "Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" (10a)
Prisoner's dilemma         
  • The relationship between zero-determinant (ZD), cooperating and defecting strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) illustrated in a [[Venn diagram]]. Cooperating strategies always cooperate with other cooperating strategies, and defecting strategies always defect against other defecting strategies. Both contain subsets of strategies that are robust under strong selection, meaning no other memory-1 strategy is selected to invade such strategies when they are resident in a population. Only cooperating strategies contain a subset that are always robust, meaning that no other memory-1 strategy is selected to invade and replace such strategies, under both strong and [[weak selection]]. The intersection between ZD and good cooperating strategies is the set of generous ZD strategies. Extortion strategies are the intersection between ZD and non-robust defecting strategies. Tit-for-tat lies at the intersection of cooperating, defecting and ZD strategies.
  • The prisoner's dilemma as a briefcase exchange
CANONICAL EXAMPLE OF A GAME ANALYZED IN GAME THEORY
IteratedPrisonersDilemma; Iterated Prisoners Dilemma; Iterated prisoner's dilemma; Prisoners' Dilemma; Prisoner's Dilemma; Prisoners Dilemma; Prisoner's dillema; Prisoner's delimma; Prisoner’s dilemma; PD scenario; Prisoner dilemma; Farmer's dilemma; Iterated prisoner dilemma; Prisoner's dilemna; Prisoner's dillemma; Prisoner's dilema; Prisoners dilemma; Prisoner's Dilemna; Prisoners' dilemma; Prisoner's paradox; Prisoners paradox; Prisoner's problem; Prisoners problem; Prisoner Dilemma; The Prisoner Dilemma; The Prisoners Dilemma; The Prisoners' Dilemma; Iterated prisoners dilemma; Prisoner's Paradox; Prisoners dilema; Prisoner s dilemma; Repeated prisoner's dilemma; Prisoners' game; Prisoner's game; Prisoners game; Prisoner game; Iterated prisoners’ dilemma; Prisoner's Dilemma (Economics); Prisoner's Dilemma (Psychology)
The prisoner's dilemma is a standard example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why two completely rational agents might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. It was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher while working at RAND in 1950.
prisoner's dilemma         
  • The relationship between zero-determinant (ZD), cooperating and defecting strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) illustrated in a [[Venn diagram]]. Cooperating strategies always cooperate with other cooperating strategies, and defecting strategies always defect against other defecting strategies. Both contain subsets of strategies that are robust under strong selection, meaning no other memory-1 strategy is selected to invade such strategies when they are resident in a population. Only cooperating strategies contain a subset that are always robust, meaning that no other memory-1 strategy is selected to invade and replace such strategies, under both strong and [[weak selection]]. The intersection between ZD and good cooperating strategies is the set of generous ZD strategies. Extortion strategies are the intersection between ZD and non-robust defecting strategies. Tit-for-tat lies at the intersection of cooperating, defecting and ZD strategies.
  • The prisoner's dilemma as a briefcase exchange
CANONICAL EXAMPLE OF A GAME ANALYZED IN GAME THEORY
IteratedPrisonersDilemma; Iterated Prisoners Dilemma; Iterated prisoner's dilemma; Prisoners' Dilemma; Prisoner's Dilemma; Prisoners Dilemma; Prisoner's dillema; Prisoner's delimma; Prisoner’s dilemma; PD scenario; Prisoner dilemma; Farmer's dilemma; Iterated prisoner dilemma; Prisoner's dilemna; Prisoner's dillemma; Prisoner's dilema; Prisoners dilemma; Prisoner's Dilemna; Prisoners' dilemma; Prisoner's paradox; Prisoners paradox; Prisoner's problem; Prisoners problem; Prisoner Dilemma; The Prisoner Dilemma; The Prisoners Dilemma; The Prisoners' Dilemma; Iterated prisoners dilemma; Prisoner's Paradox; Prisoners dilema; Prisoner s dilemma; Repeated prisoner's dilemma; Prisoners' game; Prisoner's game; Prisoners game; Prisoner game; Iterated prisoners’ dilemma; Prisoner's Dilemma (Economics); Prisoner's Dilemma (Psychology)
¦ noun (in game theory) a situation in which two players each have two options whose outcome depends crucially on the other's simultaneous choice, exemplified by two prisoners separately deciding whether to confess to a crime.

Βικιπαίδεια

Triffin dilemma

The Triffin dilemma or Triffin paradox is the conflict of economic interests that arises between short-term domestic and long-term international objectives for countries whose currencies serve as global reserve currencies. This dilemma was identified in the 1960s by Belgian-American economist Robert Triffin, who pointed out that the country whose currency, being the global reserve currency, foreign nations wish to hold, must be willing to supply the world with an extra supply of its currency to fulfill world demand for these foreign exchange reserves, leading to a trade deficit.

The use of a national currency, such as the U.S. dollar, as global reserve currency leads to tension between its national and global monetary policy. This is reflected in fundamental imbalances in the balance of payments on the current account, as some goals require an outflow of dollars from the United States, while others require an inflow.

The Triffin dilemma is usually cited to articulate the problems with the role of the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency under the Bretton Woods system. John Maynard Keynes had anticipated this difficulty and had advocated the use of a global reserve currency called 'Bancor'. Currently, the IMF's SDRs are the closest thing to the proposed Bancor but they have not been adopted widely enough to replace the dollar as the global reserve currency.

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the governor of the People's Bank of China named the reserve currency status of the US dollar as a contributing factor to global savings and investment imbalances that led to the crisis. As such, the Triffin Dilemma is related to the Global Savings Glut hypothesis because the dollar's reserve currency role exacerbates the U.S. current account deficit due to heightened demand for dollars.